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The recently enacted Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act' amends the federal securities laws' to include a safe harbor
for forward-looking3 statements. As the stormy history of the
legislation indicates, such statements present a continuing regulato-
ry dilemma.4 On the one hand, forward-looking statements by
issuers' serve an important function in an efficient market.6 On
1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) [hereinafter Reform Act].
2. In this Note, the term "federal securities laws" refers to the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994) [hereinafter Securities Act], and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1994) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
3. Forward-looking information is part of the family of soft information. See Carl
W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254,
255 (1972). Soft information concerns subjective analysis, as opposed to objectively verifi-
able historical facts. IL Forward-looking information refers specifically to different classes
of prospective financial information, including projections, predictions, and forecasts. ld. at
258.
4. Prompting the first veto override of the Clinton Administration, the Reform Act
was the subject of controversy throughout its passage from bill into law. See 141 CONG.
REC. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
5. "Issuer" refers to any person who issues or proposes to issue any security. Secu-
rities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1994). An issuer can be either a company or those per-
sons who control the company. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 468 (2d ed. Supp. 1994).
6. See Roger J. Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management Projections:
A Law and Economics Perspective, 46 MD. L. REV. 1197, 1211-18 (1987); Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Re-
search, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 787-88 (1985). Issuers, because they run a business, are
best able to interpret historical data and project its implications for the future of that
business. See Bart A. Basi et al., A Comparison of the Accuracy of Corporate and Securi-
ty Analysts, Forecasts of Earnings, 51 ACcr. REv. 244, 252 (1976) (concluding that "there
is reasonable evidence that company forecasts were better than analysts' forecasts"); Ho-
mer Kripke, The S.E.C., the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1151, 1197-99 (1970) (indicating that issuers have access to information and a famil-
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the other hand, forward-looking information is inherently unreli-
able and prone to mislead investors.7 Against the backdrop of a
federal securities law regime predicated on disclosure, the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) considered forward-looking
information so problematic that until 1972 it discouraged disclo-
sure of such information altogether! While the SEC has reversed
its position with regard to whether issuers should disclose forward-
looking information,9 SEC safe harbors provide only limited pro-
tection to forward-looking statements." This lack of SEC protec-
tion is important to issuers because forward-looking statements
that turn out to be wrong" open the door to claims by private
litigants against issuers' 2  for material misstatements or omis-
iarity with the workings and prospects for their business that accounting statements alone
cannot provide).
7. See Summary of Report on Disclosure to Investors-A Reappraisal of Administra-
tive Policies Under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, [1963-1972 Special Studies Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 74,603, at 65,242 (May 9, 1969) ("[P]rojections in filed docu-
ments might become traps for the unsophisticated who would be prone to attach more
significance to such projections than they deserve."). Issuers may be tempted to make
forward-looking statements unduly optimistic, while investors may be overly reliant on
such statements. ld.
8. See LOUiS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 128 (3d ed. 1995).
9. In the mid-1970s and 1980s, the SEC encouraged the voluntary disclosure of
forward-looking information. See Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic
Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) J 81,756, at 81,034 (Nov. 7, 1978). Recently, the SEC has interpreted agency
rules to make such disclosure mandatory in certain contexts. In the Matter of Caterpillar
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30532, [1991-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 73,830, at 63,050 (Mar. 31, 1992) (signaling that SEC intends to vigorously
enforce disclosure requirements for forward-looking information). Disclosure of presently
known information that will affect future earnings is mandatory under Item 303 of Regu-
lation S-K, while disclosure of pure forecasts is encouraged. Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No.
6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427 (1989). However, the line separating these two classes of for-
ward-looking information is blurry. See Mark S. Croft, MD&A: The Tightrope of Disclo-
sure, 45 S.C. L. REV. 477, 484-86 (1994).
10. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
11. See Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 111, 121 (N.D. Ill.)
(stating that "in an infinitely large universe of honest and careful projections, half will
turn out to be too optimistic"), affd, 67 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1995).
12. Forward-looking statements also may result in liability for signatories, Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(1) (1994), control persons, Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994),
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994), and others subject to liability under common law
principles. However, private rights of action under the federal securities laws for aider
and abettor liability, as well as secondary liability under other common law principles,
are in doubt after Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1441 (1994).
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sions." As a result, there is the perception that strike suits 4 go
hand in hand with the disclosure of forward-looking information.
In the void left by the SEC rules, 5 courts created a form of
protection for issuers' forward-looking statements called the "be-
speaks caution" doctrine. 6 The doctrine provides a mechanism
for summary judgment or dismissal when issuers provide sufficient
cautionary language to qualify forward-looking'7 statements."
13. The relevant sections under which private rights of action for material misstate-
ments or omissions in connection with the offer or sale of securities arise include sections
11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) (1994), and Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995), which was promulgated under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). The elements of a cause of action under section 11 of
the Securities Act are a misstatement or omission of a material fact in a registration
statement in circumstances in which the shares purchased are "traceable to the offering
covered by the registration statement." See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 284 (2d ed. 1990). The elements of a cause of action under section
12(2) of the Securities Act are a misstatement or omission of a material fact in a pro-
spectus of which the defendant should have known. Id. at 302-04. The elements of a
Rule 10b-5 cause of action are a misstatement or omission of a material fact, the
defendant's knowledge of its falsity and her intention that the plaintiff rely on it, the
plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the representation, and plaintiff's resulting loss. Id at
666, 683-712.
Forward-looking information may appear so subjective as not to be considered
"fact." However, most courts hold that disclosure of soft information implies a represen-
tation that the information has been formed on a reasonable basis, and such representa-
tion is considered a fact within the coverage of sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities
Act and Rule 10b-5. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092-93
(1991) (management opinion as to fairness of stock price for merger is actionable fact);
In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989) ("A projection or
statement of belief contains at least three implicit factual assertions: (1) that the state-
ment is genuinely believed, (2) that there is a reasonable basis for that belief, and (3)
that the speaker is not aware of any undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the
accuracy of the statement."), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 943 (1990). But see Barrios v. Paco
Pharmaceutical Servs., Inc., 816 F. Supp. 243, 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating with re-
spect to projections, referred to in placement memorandum "only as a mathematical
illustration of the assumptions," that "it is well settled in this and a number of other
jurisdictions that future presentations such as contained in the PPM are not statements of
material fact on which an investor can rely").
14. "Strike" or "nuisance" suits are suits that have a settlement value based on the
expected costs of litigation, independent of the merits of the claim underlying the suit
See D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance
Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
15. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
16. See generally In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-73 (3d
Cir. 1993) (describing bespeaks caution doctrine), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994);
Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures That "Bespeak Caution," 49 Bus. LAW. 481 (1994)
(same).
17. Beyond forward-looking information, some commentators would expand the doc-
trine to apply to any soft information because soft information does not correlate entirely
1995)
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The doctrine also served, in part, as the model for the safe harbor
for forward-looking statements by issuers included in the Reform
Act.' 9
However, whether an issuer seeks protection under the Re-
form Act, under the common law bespeaks caution doctrine, or
under SEC safe harbors, questions remain as to the nature and
extent of cautionary language sufficient to protect issuers making
forward-looking statements. Two of these questions relate to defin-
ing the "context" in which courts analyze cautionary statements.0
Specifically, does the sufficiency of cautionary language depend on
(1) who is hearing the cautionary language, or (2) who is speak-
ing? The former question addresses whether a plaintiff's level of
sophistication affects the amount of cautionary language necessary
to invoke the doctrine. The latter question addresses whether
cautionary language can come from sources other than the issuer
so as to take into account the total scope of information available
to investors. At the present time, the SEC is still formulating a
final version of its rules, and the contours of the Reform Act safe
harbor have not been fleshed out in litigation. Accordingly, this
Note will address questions concerning cautionary language related
to forward-looking statements from the perspective of past cases
that apply the bespeaks caution doctrine under the federal securi-
ties laws prior to the Reform Act. Insofar as the congressional
safe harbor and the proposed SEC safe harbor parallel the com-
mon law bespeaks caution doctrine, this Note will provide guid-
ance in their interpretation as well.
Because courts often apply the bespeaks caution doctrine with
little discussion of the analytical framework used to actually
with future information. Langevoort, supra note 16, at 489; see also Schneider, supra note
3, at 254-55 (giving examples of soft information). However, courts continue to apply the
doctrine only to projections, forecasts, and predictions. See, e.g., Friedman v. Arizona
World Nurseries Ltd. Partnership, 730 F. Supp. 521, 539-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (disallowing
section 10(b) claim for future expectation statements, but allowing claims for statements
regarding then existing facts).
18. Omissions of forward-looking information are similarly protected. See, e.g., In re
Trump, 7 F.3d at 371.
19. See Reform Act § 102; see also 141 CONG. REC. H13,692, at H13,703 (daily ed.
Nov. 28, 1995) (joint explanatory statement of the Committee of Conference) ("The Con-
ference Committee safe harbor, like the Senate safe harbor, is based on aspects of SEC
Rule 175 and the judicial created 'bespeaks caution' doctrine.").
20. As stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, "[T]he
'bespeaks caution' doctrine merely reflects the unremarkable proposition that statements
must be analyzed in context." Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1994).
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"weigh" cautionary language,21 questions concerning the role of
plaintiff sophistication and market information in determining the
sufficiency of cautionary language increase the uncertainty associat-
ed with the disclosure of forward-looking information and diminish
protections provided by the doctrine. Similarly, the Reform Act
leaves open questions as to the role of plaintiff sophistication and
market information in applying the statutory safe harbor.'
This Note concludes that plaintiff sophistication and market
information should not be considered by courts as part of an
analysis of cautionary language under the common law and by
extension under the congressional safe harbor. The bespeaks cau-
tion doctrine should not encourage parties to misrepresent their
opinions in forward-looking statements and then avoid liability by
arguing that the plaintiff should have known better because of her
sophistication or because information available in the market at
large suggests that the investor should have been cautioned. As
President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated, "[The Securities Act] adds
to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let the
seller also beware.' It puts the burden of telling the whole truth
on the seller."'  At the same time, this Note suggests limits that
21. See, e.g., Dulude v. Cigna Sec., Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,324, at
90;244-45 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 5, 1993); Alexander v. Evans, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,795, at 97,904 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1993); Schwartz v. Michaels,
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 91 96,920, at 93,839-40 (S.D.N.Y. July
22, 1992); O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 719 F. Supp. 222, 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
22. Section 102 of the Reform Act states, in pertinent part:
[I]n any private action arising under this title that is based on an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omission of a material fact necessary to make the
statement not misleading, a person ... shall not be liable with respect to any
forward-looking statement, whether written or oral, if and to the extent
that-(A) the forward-looking statement is-(i) identified as a forward-looking
statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements . . . or (ii)
immaterial ....
Reform Act § 102(a) (amending Securities Act § 27A(c)(1)). Whether a statement is
immaterial sometimes turns on the sophistication of the plaintiff or the scope of informa-
tion available to the market. See infra text accompanying notes 60-94. Further, there are
broad exclusions from application of the Reform Act safe harbor. See Reform Act §
102(a) (amending Securities Act § 27A(b)).
Some of the safe harbor provisions do appear to limit cautionary language to that
language which comes directly from the issuer, especially with regard to oral forward-
looking statements. See, e.g., id. § 102(a) (amending Securities Act § 27A(c)(2)). To the
degree that such cautionary language in the market is excluded from the safe harbor
analysis, this accords with the conclusions of this Note.
23. Federal Supervision of Traffic in Investment Securities in Interstate Commerce,
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will benefit issuers making forward-looking statements by creating
brighter lines and allowing for greater predictability in the applica-
tion of the bespeaks caution doctrine or the congressional safe
harbor.
Part I of this Note traces the history and doctrinal founda-
tions of the bespeaks caution doctrine. Part II then describes the
extent to which courts have considered plaintiff sophistication and
the scope of information available to investors in determining
whether issuers have made material misstatements or omissions
under the federal securities laws generally. It also describes how
courts currently disparately treat these issues in bespeaks caution
cases. Part III suggests that courts should determine whether there
is sufficient cautionary language to invoke the bespeaks caution
doctrine based solely on statements directly attributable to issuers.
I. HISTORY AND DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION OF THE
BESPEAKS CAUTION DOCTRINE
The common law bespeaks caution doctrine is still bound
within the framework of the securities laws passed in the early
1930s. Motivated by the stock market crash of 1929, the securities
laws were designed to protect investors.24 The Securities Act reg-
ulates the initial public offering and sale of securities in interstate
commerce.' The Exchange Act provides for the continuing regu-
lation of securities after their initial offering.' When promulgat-
ing the federal securities acts, Congress examined different theo-
ries of securities regulation and ultimately chose a "licensing"
scheme27 that embraced a "fundamental purpose ... to substitute
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
24. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114
S. Ct. 1439, 1445 (1994); J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE 4-5 (supp. 1994); James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities
Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 29-30 (1959); Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., The Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 214, 216-17 (1960).
25. Unless a statutory exemption is available, section 5 of the Securities Act prohib-
its the initial offer and sale of unregistered securities. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77e(a) (1994).
26. For an analysis of the SEC's current continuous disclosure system, see JAMES D.
COX ET AL, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 46-47 (1991).
27. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 413. In adopting a system of licensing, Con-
gress declined to approve a regulatory system based on merit review. See Federal Securi-
ties Act: Hearing on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 53-55, 143-44 (1933).
584 [Vol. 45:579
BESPEAKS CAUTION DOCTRINE
a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor
and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the secu-
rities industry."' Accordingly, the securities acts emphasize the
proper and timely disclosure of required information.29
However, not all information is treated identically under the
federal securities laws. The SEC, under its authority pursuant to
the Exchange Act,0 distinguishes forward-looking information
from historical information.3' For almost forty years, the SEC re-
garded forward-looking information too unreliable and misleading
to be disclosed.32 This policy interfered with the efficient alloca-
tion of resources in the marketplace and conflicted with actual
market practice.33 In 1973, the SEC announced its intention to
promulgate rules to allow voluntary disclosure of projections
without liability for civil fraud,' 4 which resulted in the creation of
safe harbor rules in 1979."5 However, the SEC safe harbor rules
28. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); see also
Central Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. at 1445; Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (stating philosophy of full disclosure replaced philosophy
of caveat emptor under the securities laws).
29. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahli, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988) (noting that Congress designed
disclosure provisions of the Securities Act to protect unsophisticated investors); Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (describing the purpose of the Ex-
change Act as one of implementing a "philosophy of full disclosure"); SEcuRrIEs Ex-
CHANGE BILL OF 1934, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934) ("[T]he hid-
ing and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the markets as
indices of real value.").
30. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994).
31. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
32. See Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in
Registration, Securities Act Release No. 5180, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) [ 78,192, at 80,578-80 (Aug. 16, 1971); Janet E. Kerr, A Walk Through the
Circuits: The Duty to Disclose Soft Information, 46 MD. L. REv. 1071, 1073 (1987) ("The
SEC's perception of the unreliability of soft information, its potential to mislead investors,
and the lack of sufficient Commission resources to evaluate its accuracy quickly negated
any benefits flowing from the disclosure of such information.").
33. See, e.g., Kripke, supra note 6, at 1197-99. Professor Kripke notes that notwith-
standing SEC policy, professionals such as brokers and analysts would receive manage-
ment projections informally through press conferences, speeches to analysts' societies, or
press releases. Id. at 1199. These projections then would help to form the basis for pro-
fessional judgment. Id.
34. Statement by the Commission on Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic
Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 79,211 (Feb. 2, 1973).
35. SEC Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1994); SEC Rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6
(1994). Because the rules are virtually identical, this Note refers to all SEC safe harbors
for forward-looking information by reference to Rule 175.
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for forward-looking statements remain poorly defined and little
used.36
Until the 1970s, courts also generally refrained from providing
any systemic incentives to counter the potential liability associated
with forward-looking statements.37 In recent years, however,
courts have taken a more proactive role in protecting issuer disclo-
sure in the face of the perceived market-distorting effect of strike
suits.38 Indeed, there is a growing trend for courts to enter sum-
mary judgment39 or dismissal40 on issues that were previously
36. See generally Note, Liability for Forward-Looking Statements: The Securities and
Exchange Commission's Ambiguous Stance, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 221 (1993). While
SEC rules insulate some issuers making forward-looking statements from liability for
fraud, the rules apply only to written documents filed with the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175
(1994). Further, the safe harbor rules are predicated on an issuer's good faith and rea-
sonable basis for making forward-looking statements. Id. § 230.175(a). The safe harbor
rules also may leave issuers with a duty to update their disclosure. See Backman v. Po-
laroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that the duty to update does not
apply to matters outside the scope of the initial disclosure).
The SEC is currently reviewing its safe harbor rules for forward-looking statements.
See Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No. 33-7101,
1994 WL 562021 (Oct. 13, 1994) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Release]. One proposed change
to the current rules, offered by Professor John Coffee, involves a codification of the com-
mon law bespeaks caution doctrine. Id. at *23. This codification, however, would still lack
the scope of the common law doctrine. The codification would apply only to forward-
looking statements made in documents filed with the Commission or to statements made
outside the filing requirement that are reaffirmed in a subsequent filing "made publicly
available within a reasonable period after the statement is first disseminated." Id. See
also Bruce Angiolillo, Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: Heading for Codification?, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 5, 1995, at 1, 6 (describing limits of proposed SEC safe harbor relative to bespeaks
caution doctrine).
37. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, at 686-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating
that earnings projections can result in Rule 10b-5 liability if there is no reasonable basis,
and that question of reasonable basis is highly fact-specific), affld, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.
1972) (per curiam); Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approach to Disclosure of
Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Chang-
ing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114, 1124-31 (1987) (discussing courts' treatment of soft
information from 1970 to 1987).
38. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975) (stating
that even a complaint that "by objective standards may have very little chance of success
at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of
success at trial").
39. See, e.g., In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989)
(entering summary judgment when defendant omitted risks known to market); Laven v.
Flanagan, 695 F. Supp. 800, 812 (D.N.J. 1988) (noting decreasing reluctance to grant
summary judgment on scienter grounds).
40. See, e.g., Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(entering dismissal even though defendant company failed to state that competitive posi-
tion was deteriorating, that restructuring and merger costs would slow growth, and that
competitor placed great pressure on company); Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d
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thought to raise factual questions not subject to judgment on the
pleadings.4' The bespeaks caution doctrine provides courts with a
means to grant dismissal or award summary judgment in such
cases.
The term "bespeaks caution" first appeared as dicta in a foot-
note in the 1977 case of Polin v. Conductron Corp.42 The doc-
trine first served as a ground for summary judgment in Luce v.
Edelstein.43 In Luce, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that allegations of intentional misrepresentation re-
garding statements in an offering memorandum could not survive
a motion to dismiss when the memorandum also contained cau-
tionary language directly addressing the statements at issue.4 Af-
ter a slow beginning, the doctrine has now mushroomed,45 with
nine circuits having adopted the doctrine.4 Further, the common
1124 (2d Cir. 1994) (dismissing 10b-5 claim in which defendant bank failed to disclose
vulnerability of loan portfolio to drop in real estate values).
41. See supra notes 38-40. In addition to deciding issues more aggressively as a mat-
ter of law, many courts increasingly rely on a variety of other doctrines that make it
easier for defendants to obtain summary judgment or dismissal. See Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1072-74 (1995) (holding that section 12(2) of the Securities Act
does not extend to secondary market transactions); Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994) (holding that no aider and
abettor liability in private 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that docu-
ments outside the pleadings can be considered on motion for summary judgment), cert
denied, 114 S. Ct. 687 (1994); Coffey v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 961 F.2d 922, 927
(10th Cir. 1992) (upholding claim preclusive effect of arbitration awards).
42. 552 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977).
43. 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
44. Id. at 56. Citing Polin, the court held that "[w]e are not inclined to impose
liability on the basis of statements that clearly 'bespeak caution."' Id.
45. A LEXIS search (Genfed library, Courts file, bespeak! /5 caution, and a subse-
quent case-by-case search to exclude false positives) found that the bespeaks caution
doctrine was cited in less then 10 cases between 1986 and 1988, 30 cases between 1989
and 1991, and 68 cases between 1992 and 1994. More cases citing the doctrine are pub-
lished every few weeks.
46. See Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assoc., Ltd., 45 F.3d 399, 399-400 (11th Cir.
1995); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Worlds of Won-
der Inc. See. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277
(1995); In re Donald Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-73 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994); Abrosino v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 972 F.2d 776 (7th
Cir. 1992); I. Meyer Pincus & Assoc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir.
1991); Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 949 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1991); Romani v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 (1st Cir. 1991); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions
Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991). Some commentators suggest that the Sixth Cir-
cuit retreated from the doctrine in Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993), after
the Supreme Court decision in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083
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law doctrine is now, to varying degrees, the basis for both the
proposed SEC47 and congressional' safe harbors for forward-
looking information.
Courts applying the bespeaks caution doctrine typically inquire
into two separate but related elements of cases in which misrepre-
sentations are made to investors: materiality and reasonable reli-
ance.49 Under the rubric of "materiality," cautionary language op-
erates within the total mix of available information to render
immaterial otherwise material misrepresentations." Under "rea-
sonable reliance," cautionary language renders possibly misleading
statements harmless because an investor could not reasonably rely
upon them. 1 Courts sometimes treat materiality and reasonable
reliance interchangeably," resting the doctrine on one or both
grounds,53 or not explicitly stating the grounds upon which they
are resting their application of the doctrine. 4 However, the
principles of materiality and reasonable reliance are not com-
pletely interchangeable. Because section 11 and section 12(2) of
(1991). See Angiolillo, supra note 36, at 5-6 n.23. It appears, however, that the Sixth
Circuit has retreated only from applying cautionary language as a per se bar to liability
for forward-looking statements. See Mayer, 988 F.2d at 639. The Sixth Circuit stated in
Mayer that "Virginia Bankshares contemplates a weighing of the true with the untrue
statements in an announcement for liability to result . . . Whether the statements here
were true or false is not an issue to be decided under Rule 12(b)(6)." Id. (emphasis
added). Although Virginia Bankshares precluded summary judgment in Mayer, the court
did not foreclose the possibility of application of the bespeaks caution doctrine in other
circumstances. Cf Cione v. Gorr, 843 F. Supp. 1199, 1203-04 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (discuss-
ing interaction of Mayer and Virginia Bankshares). The Sixth Circuit has not yet applied
the bespeaks caution doctrine in a case after Mayer.
47. See supra note 36.
48. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
49. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 478 n.172.
50. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Kline v. First Western Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 499 (3d Cir.)
(Greenberg, J., dissenting) ("I acknowledge that in Trump we held that the cautionary
language rendered the alleged misrepresentation immaterial as a matter of law while here
we are concerned with whether the plaintiffs reasonably relied on Arvey's opinion letters.
But this distinction makes no difference."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 613 (1994).
53. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that bespeaks caution doctrine rests on materiality), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219
(1994); Sable v. Southmark/Envicon Capital Corp., 819 F. Supp. 324, 333, 338 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that bespeaks caution doctrine rests on reasonable reliance and materi-
ality); Porter v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 41, 58 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (hold-
ing that bespeaks caution doctrine rests on reasonable reliance).
54. See In re Quarterdeck Office Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig., 854 F. Supp. 1466, 1472 (C.D.
Cal. 1994).
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the Securities Act do not require a showing of reasonable reliance,
grounding the bespeaks caution doctrine in materiality rather than
reasonable reliance expands the number of cases to which the doc-
trine may potentially be applied." Further, since a plaintiff's rea-
sonable reliance may be a subjective determination, the reasonable
reliance element-unlike materiality-may open the door to con-
sideration of a plaintiff's sophistication.56 Accordingly, the fact
that the bespeaks caution doctrine extends logically from both
materiality and reasonable reliance does not mean that the doc-
trine is applied identically when grounded in either element.
II. MATERIALITY AND REASONABLE RELIANCE VIS-Ak-VIS
PLAINTIFF SOPHISTICATION AND MARKET INFORMATION
Although the bespeaks caution doctrine is still in a "relatively
embryonic state,"'57 some guidelines for analyzing when caution-
ary language renders misstatements immaterial, or renders mis-
statements not subject to being reasonably relied upon, have
emerged. Mere boilerplate warnings are insufficient to invoke the
doctrine.58 Further, warnings or cautionary statements must be
specifically connected to the allegedly misleading forward-looking
statements and relevant within the context of the statements as a
whole.59 These guidelines, however, do not provide much guid-
ance in defining the elusive concepts of materiality and reasonable
reliance. For example, it remains unclear whether courts applying
the bespeaks caution doctrine consider plaintiff sophistication or
55. See supra note 13.
56. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (discussing courts' application of
subjective reasonable reliance test).
57. Langevoort, supra note 16, at 488.
58. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543-44 (5th Cir.
1981), modified, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). But see Schwartz v. Michaels, [1992 Transfer Bind-
er] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,920, at 93,840 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1992) (dismissing al-
legations that forecasts in private placement memorandum accompanied by cautionary
language were "manipulated").
59. See Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 168 (5th Cir. 1994). For example, one
cannot have generalized warnings in conjunction with very specific predictions. See Whirl-
pool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Marion Merrell
Dow Inc., Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %1 97,776, at
97,768-69 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (holding cautionary language not "repeated" and "specific"
enough to justify dismissal); In re Jenny Craig Sec. Litig., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91 97,337, at 95,723 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (holding cautionary




market information in determining whether misstatements or omis-
sions by issuers are material or subject to a plaintiff's reasonable
reliance.
A. Materiality
The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws only
prohibit material misrepresentations or omissions of fact, not mere
inaccuracies.' In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway Inc.,6" the Su-
preme Court held that a statement is material if there is "a sub-
stantial likelihood that [its] disclosure ... would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total
mix' of information made available."'62 The information need not
be such that it would actually change the reasonable investor's
investment decision.63
There is some uncertainty concerning what information would
"significantly alter the total mix of information" in the context of
forward-looking information. 64 The general rule applied to deter-
mine whether there is a substantial likelihood that forward-looking
or other soft information would significantly alter an investor's
view is based on a "balancing of both the indicated probability
that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the
event in light of the totality of the company activity."6' However,
some courts have limited the Basic Inc. v. Levinson "probabili-
ty/magnitude test" for materiality to the context of merger negoti-
60. See, e.g., Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317, 1321 (7th Cir.
1988) ("First, only 'material' misstatements permit recovery under the securities
laws .... ").
61. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
62. Il at 449. The TSC standard is higher than the Seventh Circuit's suggested
"might" standard. Northway Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 1975)
(holding that material facts include "all facts which a reasonable shareholder might con-
sider important"). While TSC involved the omission of a fact in a proxy solicitation, the
Supreme Court's holding in the case has been widely applied. See, e.g., Flamm v.
Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[L]ike every other court of appeals we
have taken the definition [of materiality] in TSC as suitable for the term wherever it ap-
pears in securities law."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987).
63. TSC, 426 U.S. at 448.
64. See Hiler, supra note 37, at 1172-95 (describing the different approaches of U.S.
courts of appeals to defining materiality of soft information).
65. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)); see also Hiler, supra note 37, at 1195
(supporting "probability/magnitude test" for determining materiality of forward-looking
statements).
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ations, and in other contexts inquire into the reliability of the
forward-looking information in question.' Regardless of which
test is applied, determining the materiality of statements or omis-
sions is highly fact-specific and remains so by design.67 In addi-
tion, regardless of which test is applied, courts determine material-
ity based upon an objective reasonable-investor standard.6' Ac-
cordingly, no bespeaks caution cases inquire into plaintiff sophisti-
cation when materiality is the sole ground on which the doctrine is
predicated.69
While the leading case applying the bespeaks caution doctrine,
In re Donald J. Trump Securities Litigation,70 states that "when
an offering document's forecasts, opinions or projections are ac-
companied by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-look-
ing statements will not form the basis for a securities fraud
claim, 71 courts sometimes inquire into information about an issu-
er disclosed by sources other than the issuer to qualify material
misstatements or omissions under the bespeaks caution doctrine.
In bespeaks-caution-doctrine cases, courts generally import the
analysis applied in cases outside the context of the doctrine ad-
dressing the issue of what publicly available information is to be
66. See, e.g., Garcia v. Cordova, 930 F.2d 826, 829-30 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the information at issue was too unreliable to be considered a material fact).
67. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Comm. Print 1977).
Although the Committee believes that ideally it would be desirable to have
absolute certainty in the application of the materiality concept, it is its view
that such a goal is illusory and unrealistic. The materiality concept is judgmen-
tal in nature and it is not possible to translate this into a numerical formula.
The Committee's advice to the [SEC] is to avoid this quest for certainty and to
continue consideration of materiality on a case-by-case basis as disclosure prob-
lems are identified.
Id. at 327.
68. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976). However, Edward
C. Fletcher III suggests that the ostensibly objective materiality test in TSC may at times
be treated as a subjective rule in Rule 10(b)-5 cases. Edward C. Fletcher III, Sophisticat-
ed Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE LJ. 1081, 1097-98. Professor
Fletcher argues that TSC is distinguishable because it involved a proxy solicitation. Id. at
1099. Further, even when treated as an objective standard, some courts implicitly recog-
nize plaintiff sophistication in the materiality analysis. Id. at 1098.
69. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 369 (3d Cir. 1993)
(applying TSC objective reasonable investor test to determine materiality), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
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considered part of the "total mix" of information available to
investors.7' Some guidelines have emerged from these non-be-
speaks caution doctrine cases that address the question of what
information goes into the total mix: Offering documents that plain-
tiffs receive, even if only constructively, are part of the total
mix;73 other documents filed with the SEC, such as the annual or
quarterly filings,74  also are generally part of the total mix.75
Some courts have held that information known to the market
about an industry in general may be considered part of the total
mix of information to determine materiality.76 In other words,
issuers have a duty to disclose only firm-specific information. For
example, in Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,77 the Seventh
Circuit held that Commonwealth Edison need not disclose the pos-
sibility that a branch of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could
deny the company's new plant an operating permit.78 However, it
is not always clear when information is firm-specific and when it
concerns an industry in general.79 Further, courts recognize that
72. See Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Valuevision
Int'l Sec. Litig., 1995 WL 490476 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1995); cf. BROWN, supra note 24, at
135 ("Whatever the reason, the total mix doctrine remains undeveloped. Courts seem
guided as much by common sense rather than any comprehensive understanding of the
doctrine.").
73. Courts uniformly consider offering documents, including proxy statements, tender
offer statements, and registration statements, designed to significantly affect investors'
decisions, and are therefore material under the TSC standard. See Loss & SELIGMAN
supra note 8, at 474-77.
74. See, e.g., Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1995) (annual report); Form 10-Q, 17
C.F.R. § 249.308a (1995) (quarterly report); Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1995) (re-
quired after occurrence of certain specified events to keep filing information current).
75. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1311, 1322 (D. Del.
1989) (holding that past annual reports are part of the total mix of information); Alizac
Partners v. Rospatch Corp., 712 F. Supp. 599, 607-608 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that a
company's past annual and quarterly reports may be viewed as part of the total mix of
information available to shareholders). But see United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Inter-
national Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190, 1200 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that documents filed with
the SEC are excluded from the total mix when considering the materiality of misstate-
ments and omissions in proxy materials).
76. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
77. 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989)
78. Id at 515. The court stated that "[ijssuers need not 'disclose' Murphy's Law or
the Peter Principle, even though these have substantial effects on business. So too issuers
need not estimate the chance that a federal agency will change its rules or tighten up on
enforcement." Id.; see also B.L. Sailors v. Northern States Power Co., 4 F.3d 610, 612
(8th Cir. 1993) (holding that after informing investors that it is involved in a regulatory
proceeding, a utility has no duty to disclose that efforts to obtain a rate increase were
"highly problematical").
79. See In re Bally Mfg. Sec. Corp. Litig., 141 F.R.D. 262, 272 (N.D. 111. 1992) (hold-
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the significance of information in the public domain may be lost
on investors." In Wechsler v. Steinberg,81 for example, the court
declined to dismiss plaintiffs' claim in which the defendant's annu-
al report omitted certain contingent liabilities, even though other
public sources contained the relevant facts.' The court refused to
grant summary judgment, noting the possibility that, as the plain-
tiffs argued, the offering materials were "so fragmented as to
inhibit comprehension."'83
Beyond information known about an industry in general,
some courts assume that firm-specific information disclosed by
sources other than the issuer, or issuer disclosure in documents
not filed with the SEC, is in the market and universally avail-
able.' This broad definition of the total mix accords with the
efficient capital market hypothesis.'s The efficient capital market
hypothesis suggests that once information enters the market it is
quickly impounded and reflected in stock price.86 However, rec-
ognizing that markets are not always efficient, courts have not
been willing to extend the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to thinly
traded securities.' Further, the corollary truth-on-the-market de-
ing that it is a mixed question of law and fact whether particular information was firm-
specific), affd sub nom. Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456 (7th Cir. 1993).
80. See, e.g., McMahon & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment Inc., 900 F.2d 576, 579
(2d Cir. 1990) (finding that information that is actually accurate can mislead investors
through manner of presentation), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1249 (1991).
81. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,449 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
13, 1976).
82. Id. at 99,276.
83. Id at 99,275-76 (holding that conflict between plaintiffs' and defendants' argu-
ments raised genuine issues of fact that precluded summary judgment).
84. See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 489.
85. See Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Reci-
pe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 419 (1984) (comparing the legal
concept of materiality with efficient capital market theory and concluding that the effi-
cient market model "guaranties the total mix concept").
86. Based on the efficient capital market hypothesis, the Supreme Court in Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), recognized the fraud-on-the-market theory. The Court
held that it is not inappropriate to apply a rebuttable presumption of reliance and mate-
riality-that is, misstatements or omissions that cause a change in a stock's price are
material-if plaintiffs can show that their purchase of stock after a material misstatement
or omission caused an adverse reaction in the stock's price, even if the plaintiffs in ques-
tion did not directly hear the statement. Id at 249-50.
87. In Alter v. DBLKM, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 799, 804 (D. Colo. 1993), the court held
that for the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be satis-
fied: (1) the security must have traded in large volume during the time period in ques-
tion; (2) a significant number of securities' analysts must have followed and reported on
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fense' recognizes that information from different sources con-
veyed by different means may be weighed differently by the mar-
ket. 9 Accordingly, some courts reject applying market informa-
tion to the bespeaks caution inquiry because of the fact-specific
nature of the efficient market analysis, and the weight to which
investors and analysts give forward-looking statements by issu-
ers.
90
In cases involving the bespeaks caution doctrine, whether a
court will consider market information when determining the suffi-
ciency of cautionary language may turn on the plaintiff's underly-
ing cause of action. For example, in Pache v. Wallace91 the court
held that plaintiffs' reliance on a fraud-on-the-market theory
opened the door to consideration of market information by the
court in determining the sufficiency of cautionary language under
the bespeaks caution doctrine.' However, other courts include
market information in the bespeaks-caution-doctrine analysis re-
gardless of the underlying cause of action. For example, the court
in Heil v. Lebow93 did not use the plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-market
claim as a predicate for considering market information in deter-
the security; and (3) the price of the security must have changed in relation to public
statements or reports about the activities of the issuer.
88. In In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 943 (1990), the Ninth Circuit held that extensive media coverage of the
risks associated with a new product, even in the same articles in which the company was
touting the product, meant that the company's alleged failure to disclose the risks did not
violate Rule 10b-5.
89. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, failure to disclose material information may be
excused only when that information has "credibly entered the market by other means"
and been conveyed with "roughly equal intensity and credibility." In re Apple, 886 F.2d
at 1114. This ruling has the practical effect of limiting the truth-on-the-market defense.
90. See, e.g., Trafton v. Deacon Barclays de Zoete Wedd Ltd. [1994-1995 Decisions
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 98,481, at 91,290 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19. 1994) (holding that
cautionary language in only one of several offering documents precludes dismissal under
the bespeaks caution doctrine).
91. [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 98,643, at 91,964 (E.D. Pa. March 20, 1995).
92. Id. at 91,969.
93. [1994-1995 Decision Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 98,465, at 91,189 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
14, 1994).
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mining the sufficiency of cautionary language. 4 No court has not-
ed this apparent split of authority.
B. Reasonable Reliance
Plaintiffs bringing claims under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5 alleging that an issuer has made a material
misstatement must show reasonable reliance" on the alleged mis-
statement, not merely that the misstatement was material.96
Whether an investor has reasonably relied is a determination
based on a factors test.' The certainty of a factors test is some-
what chimerical because there is no formula for weighing each of
the various factors and no necessary and sufficient factor for de-
termining when the reasonable investor should not have relied on
a misstatement or omission. Like materiality, therefore, reasonable
reliance lends itself to categorization as a determination of fact.
Whether a court will inquire into plaintiff sophistication under
the bespeaks caution doctrine when determining reasonable reli-
ance may turn on the factual circumstances underlying the cause
of action. While the majority of courts nominally recognize a
subjective reasonable-reliance standard,98 this general rule is limit-
94. Id.; see also Kaplan v. Kahn, [1994-1995 Decision Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
98,486, at 91,322 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 1994) ("Based on the holdings of [the Ninth Circuit
in In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994)], and the
cases that have preceded it, there are two levels to the bespeaks caution analysis . . . (2)
the language must be analyzed in the context of information known to the market at the
time of the offering.").
95. Reasonable reliance is sometimes discussed in terms of justifiable reliance, reason-
able diligence, due diligence, or duty of care. See Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of
Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71
CORNELL L. REv. 96, 102-03 (1985). Most courts and commentators view these terms as
basically interchangeable. See id.; Note, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the 'Reasonable
Investor' Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1972). But see Huddleston v. Herman &
Maclean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that reasonable reliance is a subjec-
tive test, while justifiable reliance is an objective test), affid in part, rev'd in part, 459
U.S. 375 (1983).
96. Reasonable reliance is not an element of claims under section 11 and section
12(2) of the Securies Act. See supra note 13.
97. These factors include (1) the sophistication or expertise of the investor in finan-
cial and securities matters; (2) the existence of longstanding business or personal relation-
ships; (3) access to the relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary relationship;
(5) concealment of the fraud; (6) opportunity to detect the fraud; (7) whether the investi-
gator initiated or sought to expedite the transaction; and (8) the generality or specificity
of the misrepresentations. Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 918
(6th Cir. 1991).
98. See, eg., Davidson v. Wilson, 973 F.2d 1391, 1400 (8th Cir. 1992); Molecular
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ed by presumptions of reasonableness that are applied in various
contexts. The principal limiting presumption occurs in class actions,
in which courts apply the equivalent of an objective reasonable-
ness standard, at least at the pleading stage.99 Therefore, courts
actually apply a subjective reasonable reliance test only in cases
involving private placement memorandums, close corporations, and
customer-broker relations."° The original body of cases in which
courts applied the bespeaks caution doctrine involved private
placement memorandums,'' but even in these cases, an essen-
tially objective reasonable-reliance standard is applied in the case
of misleading omissions."°
As is true in cases in which courts base the bespeaks caution
doctrine on materiality, courts have inquired into the "total mix"
of information available in determining whether an investor has
reasonably relied on issuers' misstatements or omissions."3 In-
deed, the fraud-on-the-market theory creates a presumption of
both reliance and materiality, and the question of whether courts
consider market information in order to rebut the presumption of
reliance parallels the question as applied to the element of materi-
ality."° As with materiality, there is no clear rule as to when
and if market information may be used to determine the reason-
ableness of a plaintiff's reliance. Nor is it clear that courts always
Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 1991); Myers v. Finkle, 950
F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991); Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d
1011, 1015-16 (2d Cir. 1989); Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st
Cir. 1987); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983). But see In re
Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 597, 622 (N.D. Iil. 1987) (rejecting
defendant's argument that sophisticated customers are bound by indemnity agreement).
99. See, e.g., In re Western Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 629, 633-34 (D.N.J. 1988).
100. See, e.g., Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc. v. CFTC, 794 F.2d 573, 578-79
(11th Cir. 1986) (customer-broker relations); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175,
185, 189 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982) (close corporation); Swenson v.
Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421, 427-28 (5th Cir. 1980) (private placement memorandum).
101. See, e.g., Sable v. Southmark/Envicon Capital Corp., 819 F. Supp. 324, 334
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Schwartz v. Michaels, No. 91 Civ. 3538 (RPD), 1992 WL 184527, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1992).
102. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-50 (1988). Basic leads to a rebutta-
ble presumption of reliance in cases of misleading omissions. Id. This presumption results
in the application of an objective standard of reliance because each plaintiff need not
demonstrate actual reliance. Id. at 245. Indeed, when nondisclosure is involved, proving
reliance may border on the impossible absent a presumption.
103. See Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167-69 (5th Cir. 1994); Whirlpool Fin.
Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 111, 122 (N.D. IU. 1995), affd, 67 F.3d 605
(7th Cir. 1995).
104. See supra notes 70-94 and accompanying text.
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require that plaintiffs plead the fraud-on-the-market theory before
courts will consider market information when determining reason-
ableness of reliance.' Some of the factors considered in the
eight-part factors test,106 including "access to relevant informa-
tion,"" suggest that inquiry into market information is a neces-
sary condition for determining reasonable reliance. On the other
hand, courts are sometimes reluctant to consider market informa-
tion when considering reasonableness of reliance under the be-
speaks caution doctrine because it complicates the already highly
factual reasonable-reliance-factors test.0 8  In practice, therefore,
courts inquire into market information when determining reason-
able reliance under the bespeaks caution doctrine with the same
level of unpredictability as when inquiring into the materiality of
alleged misstatements or omissions.
105. Compare In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Where a plaintiff alleges actual reliance on a particular statement, it does not matter
that the market is aware of the facts necessary to make the statement not misleading.
The plaintiff may be misled into believing that the stock has been incorrectly valued by
the market."), cert denied, 496 U.S. 943 (1990), with Hamer v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 785
F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd 35 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 1994) (considering market
information when determining reasonable reliance even absent fraud-on-the-market claim)
and Levy v. Weksel, No. 85 Civ. 0990 (VLB), 1995 WL 117637, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17,
1995) (same).
106. See supra note 97.
107. Id.
108. For example, the court in Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., 765 F. Supp. 69
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), held that it is not sufficient to prevail on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings to merely point out cautionary language in a private placement memorandum.
Id. at 74. The court stated that it is a question of fact whether investors could justifiably
rely on the alleged misstatements. Id. Similarly, the fact-specific nature of determining
materiality has led courts to restrain their application of the bespeaks caution doctrine.
See, e.g., Trafton v. Deacon Barclays De Zoete Wedd Ltd., 1994 WL 746199 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 19, 1994) (holding that cautionary language was insufficient to lead to summary
judgment, but could be considered at trial with respect to the question of materiality).
Indeed, determining the efficiency of the market, the theoretical predicate for considering
market information, is itself a fact-specific determination. See Garfinkel v. Memory Met-
als, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1397, 1403-04 (D. Conn. 1988). Similarly, determining plaintiff
sophistication may be fact-specific, as wealth alone is not determinative. Cf. SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126-27 (1953) (holding that nonpublic offering exemp-
tion from Securities Act registration requirements is predicated on access to information,
not status of investor).
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III. REFINING THE BESPEAKS CAUTION DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has indicated that the intent of Congress
governs the interpretation of the elements of actions under the
federal securities laws.'0 9 Factors to be considered in determining
congressional intent include the language and history of the statu-
tory provision in question". and the structure of the Securities
Act and Exchange Act."' Courts also may be guided by the lan-
guage of administrative rules and the rulemaking history surround-
ing their adoption." When the language and structure of a stat-
ute and congressional intent are not determinative, courts must
look to the policies underlying the statute in question.
A. Courts Should Not Consider Plaintiff Sophistication When De-
termining the Sufficiency of Cautionary Language
The language and structure of the securities laws do not re-
veal Congress's intent in defining the role of plaintiff sophistica-
tion in bespeaks caution cases. Whether courts should inquire into
each plaintiff's sophistication under Rule 10b-5 4 cannot be de-
termined from the explicit language of the federal securities
laws."' Indeed, controversy exists about the degree to which the
federal securities laws were designed to account for investor so-
phistication at all." 6 The securities laws generally make no men-
tion of plaintiff sophistication." 7 Commentators have suggested
109. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114
S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1994).
110. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988) (stating that specific language of
statutes controls interpretation based on policy).
111. Central Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. at 1441-42.
112. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975).
113. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 314
(1985).
114. Sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) (1994), do
not include a reasonable reliance element, and materiality does not include an inquiry
into plaintiff sophistication. See supra note 13.
115. See Sachs, supra note 95, at 117 ("[N]othing in section 10(b) suggests that a de-
fendant might avoid liability because of the victim's carelessness."); see also Donald C.
Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S7 (1993) (not-
ing flexibility and open-ended language of Rule 10b-5).
116. See generally Fletcher, supra note 68, at 1099.
117. Id. The definition of accredited investor in section 2(15) of the 1933 Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15) (1994), is a notable exception to the general lack of regard for
plaintiff sophistication. However, accreditation is relevant to only a few sections of the
securities laws. See Securities Act § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1994) (sales to accredited
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that the structure of the Exchange Act 8 argues against the ap-
plication of differing standards based on plaintiff sophistica-
tion.'19 Because the statutory language is not determinative,
courts look to the legislative history of the securities laws to guide
interpretation of the provision in question. 20 The legislative his-
tory, however, is similarly uninstructive."
The public policy goals explicitly embodied in the federal
securities laws cannot be reconciled with inquiry into plaintiff so-
phistication when applying the bespeaks caution doctrine. The
overwhelming thrust of the securities laws is the protection of in-
vestors.' 22 Most inquiries into plaintiff sophistication, however,
benefit issuers." In each case in which a court has considered
an individual investor's sophistication in applying the bespeaks
caution doctrine, the court has ultimately granted defendants sum-
mary judgment or dismissal. 24
investors exception to 1933 Act registration requirements). Investor sophistication also is
considered a factor in determining whether there has been a nonpublic offering of securi-
ties under section 4(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). See SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
118. In addition to comparing related laws, determining statutory structure involves
comparing the language and express remedies within the Act as a whole. See Sachs,
supra note 95, at 121.
119. See, e.g., id at 121-29 (critiquing method of interpretation based on statutory
structure, specifically with reference to plaintiff sophistication under the Exchange Act).
120. Pinter v. Dahli, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988).
121. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (The legislative histo-
ry surrounding section 10(b) is "bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent.");
Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385, 385 (1990) ("Section 10(b) is seldom mentioned in the committee re-
ports, floor statements and published hearings on the Exchange Act .... ").
122. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-51 (1972)
("The Court has said that the 1934 Act and its companion legislative enactments embrace
a 'fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philoso-
phy of caveat emptor."' (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963))).
123. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 68, at 1095.
124. See, e.g., Sable v. Southmark/Envicon Capital Corp., 819 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); Harner v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 785 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd, 35 F.3d
565 (6th Cir. 1994); Hottinger v. Amcoal Energy Corp., 89 Civ. 6391, 1992 WL 349851,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1992); Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1222
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Shochat v. Weisz, 797 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Schwartz v.
Michaels, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,920 (S.D.N.Y. July 22,
1992); Haggerty v. Comstock Gold Co., 765 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Jack-
son Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., [1993-94 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 98,058 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1993), affd, 32 F.3d 697 (2d Cir. 1994) (using
plaintiff sophistication factor in determining when plaintiffs were on inquiry notice leading
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While inquiry into plaintiff sophistication could argue for the
necessity of more cautionary language if an investor is unsophisti-
cated, courts generally do not inquire into plaintiff sophistication
to protect investors."z Courts note that in an institutionalized
market, investors, no matter their sophistication, receive statements
about an issuer primarily through the filter of market intermediar-
ies.126 Further, accounting for a lack of plaintiff sophistication
could work contrary to its purposes and result in a flood of infor-
mation, increasing the costs of capital formation and resulting in a
net loss for investors. 27
Because inquiry into plaintiff sophistication as part of a rea-
sonable-reliance analysis is a one-way street in favor of issuers, it
dilutes the deterrence value of the antifraud rules and provides a
defense for otherwise culpable defendants. For example, the court
in Hottinger v. Amcoal Energy Corp." dismissed the plaintiffs'
section 10(b) complaint without addressing the defendant's alleged-
ly fraudulent misstatements and omissions. Through private place-
ments, the defendant, Amcoal, sold limited partnerships in coal
mines that operated as investment tax shelters.129 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants did not apply any of the proceeds
from the placement towards developing mines, and that the defen-
dants deliberately and systematically misapplied investor funds. 30
It is unclear whether these claims had any merit because the court
summarily dismissed the case, stating that "[c]autionary language
to statute of limitations and, on an alternate ground, applying the bespeaks caution doc-
trine).
125. In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 832 F. Supp. 948, 976 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (denying
plaintiff argument that plaintiffs lack of sophistication requires increased cautionary lan-
guage). Lack of sophistication appears to protect investors only in customer-broker rela-
tion cases. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 896-902. Brokers, however, are not
in a position to issue the soft information that the bespeaks caution doctrine is designed
to protect.
126. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 128-29; In re Westinghouse, 832 F.
Supp. at 976. But see Joel Seligman, Another Unspecial Study: The SEC's Market 2000
Report and Competitive Developments in the United States Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAW.
485, 490-91 (1995) (While institutionalized investors may comprise an increasingly large
percentage of the capital markets, the raw number of individual investors continues to in-
crease.).
127. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976).
128. 89 Civ. 6391 (LLM), 1992 WL 349851 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1992).
129. Id. at *1. The defendants allegedly projected that "year-end tax deductions




shows that plaintiff, a highly sophisticated investor, should have
appreciated that there were significant risks associated with the
placement ... 131
Similarly, in Hayden v. Feldman"2 the court dismissed the
plaintiffs' claims without addressing the alleged fraud of the defen-
dants. In Hayden, defendants were selling limited partnerships in
which each of the general partners would act as commodities bro-
ker-dealers who traded primarily in metals and government-backed
securities. The defendants represented that the plaintiffs would be
entitled to declare their share of the partnership's profits as ordi-
nary income and to deduct any losses under the federal income
tax. Based on language in a private placement memorandum
suggesting that investors should seek outside advice before invest-
ing,"M the court dismissed the case under Rule 9(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that the plaintiffs failed to
allege any facts supporting a rational inference that the representa-
tions in the placement memorandum were false when made.135
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had looted the partner-
ship through sham monetary transfers between the partnerships
and affiliated corporations in the form of commissions and
fees." Churning and breach of contract would appear to raise
an inference that the defendants never intended to uphold their
duties under the limited partnership, and therefore representations
regarding potential returns may have been false when made. As
indicated by Hayden and Amcoal, plaintiff sophistication is some-
times used by courts to justify an expansive interpretation of the
bespeaks caution doctrine. This expansive interpretation, however,
borders on the common law doctrine of caveat emptor and gives
culpable defendants an excuse because of the plaintiff's perceived
cupidity. 37
131. Id. at *5.
132. 753 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
133. Id. at 117.
134. Id. at 120.
135. Id. at 120-21.
136. Id. at 118.
137. While private rights of action are not the sole deterrence mechanism that the
securities laws provide, they may be the most effective in some cases. See Berner v.
Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The resources of the Securities Ex-
change Commission are adequate to prosecute only the most flagrant abuses. To this end,
private actions brought by investors have long been viewed as a necessary supplement to
SEC enforcement actions.") (citations omitted), affd sub nom. Bateman Eichler, Hill
1995]
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To be sure, in some cases the tension between deterring
fraudulent statements by issuers and the exigencies of capital for-
mation in an efficient market results in the denial of recovery to
plaintiffs. As some courts have indicated, the federal securities
laws were not designed to defend sophisticated investors from bad
investment decisions.38 Common law defenses such as estoppel,
waiver, and in pari delicto operate to deny plaintiff recovery. 3 9
However, these defenses are limited and usually apply only when
the plaintiff is equally culpable for any wrongdoing as the defen-
dant."4 Further, while cautionary language does not insulate an
issuer from liability for fraud related to forward-looking statements
when the issuer knew the statements were fraudulent at the time,
or when the issuer did not have a reasonable basis to believe in
the truth of the statements, 4' it is not certain that these
principles necessarily operate to limit the scope of the doctrine.
Because the bespeaks caution doctrine ends actions before discov-
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985); INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS AcT oF
1983, H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983) ("In recent years, the securities
markets have grown dramatically in size and complexity, while Commission enforcement
resources have declined."). SEC enforcement actions are not foreclosed by reasonable
reliance and due diligence defenses. However, the possibility of private litigation along
with the possibility of SEC enforcement action is necessarily a more effective in terrorem
sanction than the possibility of SEC action alone. See supra note 122. This is also the
implicit holding in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The Supreme
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's holding that no remedy would be available absent a
showing of harm and allowed plaintiffs to recover their attorneys fees. Mills, 396 U.S. at
384-85. By so holding, the Court recognized the value of private rights of action in en-
forcing the federal securities laws.
138. See, e.g., Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 428 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (stating that the Exchange Act
was not intended to protect investors who lose their innocence, and then wait and see
how investments turn out before invoking Exchange Act protections), modified on other
grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
139. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310-11 (1985);
see generally John P.A. Bell, How to Bar an Innocent Investor-The Validity of Common
Law Defenses to Private Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 U. FLA.
L. REV. 1 (1970) (discussing how a securities plaintiff can be denied recovery based on
tort concepts of wrongful conduct or maxims of equity such as in pari delicto).
140. In Bateman Eichler, the Supreme Court stated that in circumstances in which the
plaintiff is as culpable for her injury as the defendant, the "preclusion of suit would not
significantly interfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection
of the investing public." Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 311.
141. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090-98 (1991) (holding
that directors who make statements of belief that they do not actually believe may be
liable for misstatements of material fact related to the statements in question, but that
such disbelief alone is not a sufficient basis to sustain an action).
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ery and trial, it is difficult for plaintiffs to obtain sufficient evi-
dence to show the issuers' subjective belief concerning the issuers'
opinions. 4 When added to the Rule 9(b) requirement that
plaintiffs plead fraud with particularity, significant hurdles to trial
exist even when a defendant may be acting with sufficient scienter
to support a claim for fraud.' 4'
B. Courts Should Not Consider Market Information When Deter-
mining the Sufficiency of Cautionary Language
Congressional intent and the language of the securities laws
are ambiguous with respect to whether information outside of that
provided by issuers should be considered in applying the doc-
trine.'" Sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act as well as
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act do not address
the scope of information to be considered in determining material-
ity or reasonable reliance. 4 Because the language of the securi-
ties laws and congressional intent do not explicitly resolve this
question, the policy embodied in the securities laws must be con-
sidered. An analysis of these policy considerations reveals that
limiting cautionary language to written or spoken statements by
issuers accords with the purpose of the federal securities laws to
protect investors while providing enough protection to issuers to
encourage forward-looking statements.
A definition of "context" limited to statements by issuers still
provides protection to forward-looking statements by issuers.
Courts that cite the bespeaks caution doctrine implicitly support a
four-corners approach to analyzing cautionary language." Cau-
tionary language cannot be matched up against allegedly mislead-
142. Provenz v. Miller, No. C-92-20159, 1994 WL 485925, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 27,
1994) (stating that cautionary language undercuts inference of defendant's scienter with
regard to section 10(b)); Ruff v. Genesis Holding Corp., 728 F. Supp. 225, 228 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (stating that it may be difficult to prove scienter when warnings in offering litera-
ture "bespeak caution").
143. See William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without Reason,
60 S. CAL L. REv. 959, 985-86 (1987) (describing the purpose of Rule 9(b) and noting
that this Rule may be applied in a manner that essentially forecloses any cause of ac-
tion).
144. See supra notes 115, 121.
145. See supra notes 70-94, 103-108 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 369 (3d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994); I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs. v. Oppenheimer &
Co., 936 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1991).
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ing statements one-to-one, but must be considered within the
document as a whole. 47 While excluding market information lim-
its the scope of cautionary language, the four corners definition of
context is inherently broad and protective of issuers because it
does not permit plaintiffs to mischaracterize issuer statements that
might appear misleading if read alone. Further, the bespeaks cau-
tion doctrine is applied so that written cautionary language con-
trols alleged oral misstatements or omissions. As stated in Brown
v. E.F. Hutton Group,"4 "[A]ny reasonable investor knows to be
somewhat wary of a selling agent's oral representations and to
check them against the written materials.' 49 Oral statements are
not protected by the SEC safe harbor rules unless they are re-
affirmed in a subsequent SEC filing."' Therefore, limiting cau-
tionary language to language directly from the issuer still provides
greater protection for issuers than the SEC safe harbor. A narrow
definition of context only would preclude forward-looking
statements from being qualified by information known to the
market that is not directly attributable to the issuer.
The bespeaks caution doctrine also operates concurrently with
other doctrines that are protective of issuers, vitiating the need for
courts to apply an expansive view of the total mix of information
in order to protect forward-looking statements by issuers from lia-
bility. Some other doctrines that protect issuers from liability in
the context of forward-looking statements are (1) puffery,' (2)
no duty to disclose, ' 2 (3) fraud-by-hindsight,153  and (4) truth-
147. In re Trump, 7 F.3d at 370-71.
148. 735 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 991 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1993).
149. ld. at 1202; see also Davidson v. Wilson, 973 F.2d 1391, 1401 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding that investors were not justified in relying on oral representations that contradict
the written materials); Ambrosino v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 972 F.2d 776, 786 (7th
Cir. 1992) (stating that because written materials control oral statements, oral variances
are not a basis for liability); Feinman v. Schulman Berlin & Davis, 677 F. Supp. 168,
170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that truthful written disclosure controls alleged false oral
disclosure).
150. Safe Harbor Release, supra note 36, at *4-5.
151. Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289-90 (4th Cir. 1993). But see In re
B. Fennekohl & Co., [1961-64 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 76,872, at
81,229-30 (Sept. 18, 1962) (rejecting application of the common law doctrine of caveat
emptor, which tolerated puffing, to the merchandising of securities).
152. See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516-18 (7th Cir. 1989).
153. Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456, 1467-68 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[T]emporal proximity
between positive statements stressing a firm's strengths and announcements of poor eco-




on-the-market. 154 Although these doctrines are similar in some
respects, each is distinct from one another and from the bespeaks
caution doctrine. Puffery is a claim that the forward-looking state-
ments in question are harmless such that no reasonable investor
could rely on them. Puffing statements need not be qualified by
cautionary language. Similarly, if defendants have no duty to dis-
close information, they cannot be liable for its omission, regardless
of the materiality of that information or their intent. The fraud-by-
hindsight doctrine restates the principle that forward-looking state-
ments made in good faith and with a reasonable basis are not
actionable. The truth-on-the-market defense requires that in an
efficient capital market, a body of public information exists that
allows defendants to rebut the presumption of reliance based on
the fraud-on-the-market theory.55
The efficient capital market hypothesis should not be applied
in bespeaks caution cases. Issuers are uniquely capable of provid-
ing cautionary language to investors in a prospectus or other offer-
ing documents. It is not the market or the security itself that
should be understood to be "bespeaking caution" but the caution-
ary statements by the issuer. The cost to issuers is minimal in this
regard. Therefore, issuers should disclose assumptions that underlie
their cautionary language, even if these assumptions involve gener-
al statements that are likely to be already in the public domain.
While the efficient market hypothesis argues that the market as a
whole impounds information about an issuer,'56 highly efficient
markets exist for only the largest issuers.'57 Inefficient markets
are especially prevalent in the case of initial public offerings and
private placements,58 contexts in which the majority of bespeaks
154. See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989) (fraud-
on-the-market reliance rebutted when sufficient truthful information in market), cert. de-
nied, 496 U.S. 943 (1990).
155. See Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) (no defense
to fraud-on-the-market claim when there is no press information regarding risks of invest-
ment).
156. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
157. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMHTrEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., Report of the Sec. Exch. Comm'n, at xviii-xix, 40-42 (Comm. Print
1977) (fewer than 1,000 of the more than 10,000 companies filing SEC reports were
followed closely by one or more analysts at any time); see also William K.S. Wang, Some
Arguments That the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 357
(1986).
158. See Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule 19c-4
and to Professor Gilson, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 991-1000 (1989) (arguing that
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caution cases occur.159 Therefore, limiting cautionary language to
statements by issuers will not affect most cases while providing
predictability for all. Further, the efficient-market hypothesis rec-
ognizes that information from different sources has different im-
pacts on the market.'" Therefore, the statements of analysts or
journalists cannot necessarily rebut forward-looking statements by
issuers. The validity of the efficient capital market hypothesis is
itself in question.'
Market information should not be considered under the be-
speaks caution doctrine by combining the doctrine with other issu-
er-protective doctrines. Courts that currently consider market in-
formation under the rubric of bespeaks caution sometimes hybrid-
ize issuer-protective doctrines. As noted above, although issuer-
protective doctrines do overlap in some respects, they are distinct.
For example, in In re Northern Telecom Ltd. Securities Litiga-
tion,62 the court appears to mix puffery with the bespeaks cau-
tion doctrine. The court in Northern Telecom stated that allega-
tions in a complaint must be "considered as a whole and the
statements challenged in the complaint must be viewed in con-
text.' 63 The court then held that the plaintiffs could not rea-
sonably rely on the representations in question, citing the bespeaks
caution doctrine 164 and the puffery doctrine 65 in alternate
paragraphs as part of the context without discussing their relation.
Either the statements should be nonmaterial ab initio under the
puffery doctrine or they should be considered material but ren-
dered immaterial as a matter of law under the bespeaks caution
doctrine. The latter proposition opens the door to pleading that
investors' lack of information results in added weight being given to issuers' evaluations
of assets, liabilities, and risks associated with a nascent business and their relevance to
the future of the business in context of an initial public offering).
159. Langevoort, supra note 16, at 483.
160. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclosure,
and Price Discovery, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 843 (1994) (arguing that the efficient
capital market hypothesis is flawed and that markets are better described by means of
chaos theory); Wang, supra note 157, at 363-66.
162. [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,390, at 90,657
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1994).
163. Id. at 90,661.
164. Id. at 90,662.
165. The court held that some of the defendant's "statements . . . are the sort of
vacuous truisms and bland 'corporate-speak' that no rational investor would consider
material." Id. at 90,661.
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the defendants lacked good faith or a reasonable basis for making
the forward-looking statements in question.
The tendency toward hybridization is especially pronounced
with respect to bespeaks caution and truth-on-the-market claims.
In Porter v. Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc.,' 66 the district court
held that written cautionary statements in the prospectus control
alleged oral misstatements. 67 The court then went on to say that
the plaintiffs could not reasonably rely on the alleged misstate-
ments when considered in light of the cautionary language in the
prospectus and of the information in the public domain.1' How-
ever, either the cautionary statements in the written document
should immunize the alleged misstatements under bespeaks caution
or the information in the public domain should immunize the
alleged misstatements under truth-on-the-market. While the cau-
tionary statements are themselves in the public domain, the truth-
on-the-market defense requires a showing that (1) the market is
efficient, and (2) that the information in the public domain is
intense enough to neutralize the misstatements.169 As stated by
the district court in In re Taxable Municipal Bonds Litigation,70
"Courts allowing the [truth-on-the-market] defense have empha-
sized the strict evidentiary standards a defendant must meet to
rebut the reliance presumption in this manner. The determination
is fact intensive and, therefore, the defendants have an onerous
burden on summary judgment.''
Similarly, In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation'72 is
illustrative of the expansive interpretation courts give the bespeaks
caution doctrine when they consider cautionary language in the
market at large.73 Worlds of Wonder, a company that experi-
166. 802 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
167. Id. at 57.
168. Id. at 58.
169. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
170. [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,405 (E.D. La. Sept.
26, 1994).
171. Id. at 98,405. The evidentiary burden for a truth-on-the-market claim even may
require an event study based on regression analysis to show that the market impounded
enough truthful information to neutralize the allegedly misleading statements. Id. This es-
sentially sets the stage for a battle of experts, which should be resolved by the finder of
fact.
172. 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994), affg in part, rev'g in part 814 F. Supp. 850 (N.D.
Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995).
173. See generally Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Securities Act vs. Bespeaks Caution: In
1995]
608 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:579
enced tremendous growth based on sales of Teddy Ruxpin, the
talking bear, conducted a public offering of "junk bonds" in
1987."74 In the bond prospectus, Worlds of Wonder projected
that it could meet its capital needs until the end of March
1988.175 In a section of the prospectus entitled "Risk Factors,"
Worlds of Wonder listed some grounds for the unreliability of its
projection as to liquidity.76 Within one month following the
bond Offering, Worlds of Wonder defaulted on the first bond pay-
ment. 77 Investors sued under sections 11 and 12(2) of the Secu-
rities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.7" The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment on
the relevant claims.
The Ninth Circuit stated that the cautionary language at bar
sufficed when analyzed in the context of (1) the bond prospectus
as a whole combined with (2) information known to the market at
the time of the offering concerning the risk of junk bonds and the
uncertainties of the toy industry.179 However, problems with capi-
talization and overextension, which were a significant part of
Defense of the Securities Act-Part II, 16 SEC. & FED. L. REP. 169 (1994).
174. A junk bond is a bond that bears an above-market interest rate to compensate
for the risk associated with its below investment grade rating. See Worlds of Wonder, 35
F.3d at 1411. The bonds in the Worlds of Wonder offering were subordinated debentures
paying 9%, convertible at $17.50, 20% above the then-market price of Worlds of Wonder
common stock. James P. Miller, Worlds of Wonder Trims Debt Offer to $80 Million,
WALL ST. J., June 5, 1987, at 47.
175. Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1415.
176. See In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 863 (1993), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 35 F.3d 1407 (1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995). Worlds of
Wonder cautioned that its projection of liquidity was contingent because it was based on
Worlds of Wonder's dependence on a single product line, the competition in the highly
competitive toy market, and heavy dependence on accounts receivable. Id. at 860, 863.
For example, under "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations-Liquidity and Capital Resources," the company stated:
Since its inception, the Company's internally generated cash flow has not been
sufficient to finance accounts receivable, inventory and capital equipment needs,
as well as support its growth. The Company has met its capital requirements to
date primarily through borrowings under bank lines of credit, the private and
public sale of equity securities and borrowings under subordinated notes payable
to shareholders.
Id. at 863.
177. The default apparently resulted from a general downturn in the toy market, pro-
duction and delivery problems, and too much debt. Id. at 854-55.
178. Id. at 853. Investors also brought suit on the sale of stock in an initial public
offering in 1986. Id. at 855.
179. See Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1413, 1415.
BESPEAKS CAUTION DOCTRINE
Worlds of Wonder's failure,180 are precisely the type of compa-
ny-specific information that should be disclosed.1' The counter-
point to Worlds of Wonder may be seen in Forrester v. Microtest,
Inc.," a case in which an Arizona district court dismissed sec-
tion 11 claims, noting that "[t]he registration statement ... specifi-
cally stated that the industry was risky, profits were volatile, and
the failure of one product could really impact the success of the
company."'"3 Indeed, in Worlds of Wonder the riskiness of the
market apparently did not discount the value of securities offered,
which sold at a premium despite Worlds of Wonder's precarious
cash position."M
CONCLUSION
The federal securities laws reject the common law notion that
the cautionary words caveat emptor should guide the capital mar-
kets. At the same time, the necessity of remaining competitive in
global capital markets precludes the overly paternalistic regulation
of securities. In the case of forward-looking statements, however,
market efficiency may be inadequate to protect investors because
such statements are weighted disproportionately by analysts and
investors relative to other information in the market. Indeed, as
Congress and the SEC strengthen safe harbors for forward-looking
information, requiring issuers to invoke these safe harbors based
only on their own statements is a sensible counterbalance to what
some perceive as a move toward overly laissez-faire regulation of
such soft information. The real cost to some issuers is that less
analysts and investors will be likely to be misled by overly opti-
mistic projections, predictions, and forecasts. For most issuers, the
180. See id at 1411-12.
181. This is especially significant given Worlds of Wonder's propensity to be overly
optimistic about its prospects for the future in public statements. See Carrie Dolan,
Changing Fortunes: Yesterday's Marvel, Worlds of Wonder Inc. Is in Worlds of Trouble,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1987, at A4 (" 'Management [of Worlds of Wonder] hasn't been as
credible as the Street would have liked,' says Steven Eisenberg, a Bear, Steams & Co.
analyst. 'They're clearly too optimistic.' Adds analyst Mark Friedman of Boston's
Homans, McGraw, Trull, Valeo & Co.: 'There's a lot of overhype by the company.' ").
182. [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $1 98,072, at 98,639 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 15, 1993).
183. Id. at 98,641-42.
184. See In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 854 (N.D. Cal. 1993),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277
(1995).
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limits to the doctrine suggested by this Note will provide brighter
lines and greater predictability when making forward-looking state-
ments.
